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H.L. Edwards
SAPC-12315
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EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 29 January 1957
SUBJECT : Status of Deployment of Detachment C

1. We have been trying since last October 25th to obtain facilities for AQUATONE in the Far East. Twice in that period the President has indicated that he favored the deployment of a Detachment to Japan. The Air Staff is opposing this almost wholly for reasons of jurisdictional jealousy. That this is their motivation was confirmed to me by Richard Horner (Assistant Secretary for Research and Development) only two days ago. I am inclined to think that Admiral Radford is either quietly supporting the Air Force or, at best, will not oppose the Air Force on our behalf.

2. The tactic now being employed is to treat this decision as a relatively unimportant one having no particular urgency. Everyone is too busy even to talk about it, yet no one is willing to make a move without consulting everyone else. I believe the only way you can get a decision made is by being tough. Specifically, I think you should ask Radford and Twining to support your request to the Navy for a hangar at Atsugi, and should say to them perfectly politely that if they are unwilling to do so you are going back to the President for a specific mandate.

3. I feel that you personally will have to spend considerable time on this matter if it is going to get settled. Moreover, you may become involved in a real controversy, although I doubt if the opposition is as strong as it was several months ago. It may well be that you will conclude that the game is not worth the candle and that we better abandon all plans to go to the Far East. In that case we should promptly deactivate our C Detachment.

4. We are spending [redacted] a month in current operating costs and are still buying equipment. We are tying up quite a lot of scarce and valuable types of personnel. Meanwhile the morale of this organization is going to pieces as a result of uncertainties which seem to imply a lack of attention at high levels coupled with growing Air Force antagonism. This situation to me seems intolerable when the reasons for indecision and opposition are as flimsy as we know them to be. If it turns out that you are powerless to put an end to the endless postponements of the last two months and force a decision, you would seem to me to have an obligation so to advise the President.

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RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.

cc: DDCI

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